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SANCTIONING DEFENDANTS' NON-WILLFUL DELAY:




For as long as parties have pursued claims through litigation,
those against whom claims are asserted have delayed the litigation
process. Defendants, and other parties against whom claims are as-
serted,' (hereinafter collectively referred to as defendants), fail to
answer complaints against them in time; they delay in responding
to discovery requests, motions and court orders, and they fail to
appear for trials and other proceedings.
Defendants' delay subverts the goal of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure to achieve the "speedy" resolution of disputes.2 Delay is
harmful because it frustrates plaintiffs' ability to vindicate their
rights:3 justice delayed may be justice denied.4 Moreover, delay in
a particular case may divert limited judicial resources from other
cases, thereby harming other litigants and potential litigants as
* Visiting Assistant Professor of Law, Vermont Law School; B.A., 1979, University of Illi-
nois; J.D., 1983, Boston University School of Law; Law Clerk, 1983-85, Honorable Malcolm
Muir, United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania, Williamsport,
Pa.; Associate, 1985-87, Jenner & Block, Chicago, Ill.; Faculty, Vermont Law School 1987.
1. Claims in federal civil litigation are not only asserted by plaintiffs against defendants,
but also by defendants against plaintiffs (counterclaims), see FED. R. CIV. P. 13, by defend-
ants against co-defendants (cross-claims), see id., and by defendants as third party plaintiffs
against third party defendants (third as party claims), see id. R. 14. For the sake of simplic-
ity, this article will speak in terms of claims by plaintiffs against defendants.
2. Id. R. 1.
3. Judge Posner has noted that not all "delay" is harmful. Posner, An Economic Ap-
proach to Legal Procedure and Judicial Administration, 2 J. LEGAL STUDIEs 399, 445-48
(1973). Delay produces certain benefits. Id. at 447. Moreover, some delay between the time
the claim arises and the time the case is resolved is necessary in order for the parties to be
able to prepare. Id.
In the situation with which this article is concerned, i.e., where a plaintiff seeks some
sanction against a defendant in order to force the defendant to respond or to redress harm
suffered by the plaintiff as a result of the delay, it seems fair to assume that delay is harm-
ful to the plaintiff. If it were not, it is unlikely that the plaintiff would pursue a default
judgment or other sanction.
4. See generally H. ZEisFL, H. KALVEN & B. BUCHHOLZ, DELAY IN THE COURT at xxi-xxiii
(1959).
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well. Excessive delay prevents the judicial system from serving its
essential function of translating rights "into daily realities for the
bulk of citizens." 5
In order to prevent delay and thereby promote the speedy reso-
lution of disputes, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide for
various sanctions for delay,' among them the Rule 55 default judg-
ment. In the case of delay by defendants in certain contexts-such
as responding to a complaint7 or appearing for trial-a default
judgment is the only sanction for delay provided by the Rules.8
Consequently, plaintiffs frequently seek default judgments. In 1987
alone, the default judgment sanction was an issue in over seventy
reported federal court decisions.'
5. Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law: The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
in Historical Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 909, 913 (1987).
6. Rules 41 and 55 provide sanctions directed specifically at delay. Rule 41 provides for
involuntary dismissal of a lawsuit where the plaintiff fails to prosecute the suit. FED. R. CIv.
P. 41(b). Rule 55 provides for a default judgment against a defendant who delays in defend-
ing the suit. Id. R. 55.
Other provisions of the Rules contain sanctions aimed at other conduct that is likely to
cause delay. Sanctions are available under Rules 7 and 11 for delay resulting from frivolous
motions and other filings, under Rule 16 for delay in connection with pre-trial and schedul-
ing conferences and orders, under Rules 26 and 37 for delay resulting from abuse of the
discovery process, and under Rule 68 for delay resulting from a plaintiff's rejection of an
offer of judgment more favorable than the result ultimately obtained at trial. Id. R. 7, 11,
16, 26, 37, 68.
7. The most common situation in which a default judgment is sought is where a defend-
ant delays in responding to a complaint. See, e.g., Hritz v. Woma Corp., 732 F.2d 1178 (3d
Cir. 1984). Although the problem of delay in the litigation process has received considerable
attention in recent years, delay in the context of answering complaints has been largely
ignored. Cf. Posner, supra note 3, at 446 (traditional measure of delay is inaccurate because
it excludes pre-answer stage). It makes little sense to focus on delay at other stages of the
litigation while ignoring delay at the pre-answer stage. "[A]ny delay-reduction effort...
should be accompanied by controls at all stages of the civil process." T. CHURCH, A. CARL-
SON, J. LEE, & T. TAN, JUSTICE DELAYED: THE PACE OF LITIGATION IN URBAN TRIAL COURTS 70
(1978) [hereinafter CHURCH]. It would be of little consequence if we eliminated delay during
the discovery process, for example, but failed to insure that such delay was not simply
shifted to the pre-answer stage. "[The] uncontrolled segment of case progress. . . may sim-
ply absorb any time saved in other parts of the process, leaving no net gain for the litigant."
Id. at 67.
8. While Rule 12 establishes the time within which a defendant must answer a complaint
(20 days from service of the complaint except when the federal government is the defend-
ant), Rule 12 provides no sanction for failure to answer in time. FED. R. CIv. P. 12. Rule 55
expressly provides for entry of a party's default for failure "to plead or otherwise defend as
provided by these rules." Id. R. 55(a).
9. Decisions at the circuit court of appeals level include United States v. V & E Eng'g
Co., 819 F.2d 331 (1st Cir. 1987); Men's Sportswear, Inc. v. Sasson Jeans, Inc., 834 F.2d 1134
(2d Cir. 1987); Lolatehy v. Arthur Murray, Inc., 816 F.2d 951 (4th Cir. 1987); Technical
Chem. Co. v. IG-LO Prods. Co., 812 F.2d 222 (5th Cir. 1987); INVST Fin. Group v. Chem-
Nuclear Sys., 815 F.2d 391 (6th Cir. 1987); Passarella v. Hilton Int'l Co., 810 F.2d 674 (7th
204
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The default judgment sanction clearly promotes a speedy resolu-
tion of a dispute, yet it does so at the expense of the Federal Rules'
goal of resolving cases on their merits. Entry of a default judgment
means that a defendant is deemed to admit the allegations of the
complaint and is therefore denied the opportunity to defend on the
merits. When a default judgment is sought against a defendant
who has delayed, the goals of speedily resolving disputes and
resolving them on their merits come into conflict.
This conflict is easily resolved when a defendant has delayed
willfully 10 Although the Rules favor resolution on the merits, a de-
fendant who has willfully delayed has, in effect, waived his tight to
defend on the merits. Thus, a default judgment may be appropri-
ate to protect the plaintiff's interest in a speedy resolution of the
dispute. If a defendant's delay is not willful, however, imposition
of a default judgment is more difficult to justify. Indeed, relying on
the policy favoring resolution on the merits, the federal courts to-
day frequently refuse to impose a default judgment as a sanction
for non-willful delay."
While the majority of courts properly refuse to sanction non-
willful delay with a default judgment, the Rules fail to provide any
alternative sanction. As a result, the Rules provide no sanction at
all for those cases in which a default judgment is deemed inappro-
priate. Absent a sanction, there is no deterrent to such delay, de-
fendants who delay often walk away scot-free and plaintiffs are not
Cir. 1987); Swink v. City of Pagedale, 810 F.2d 791 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 3274
(1987); Joseph v. Office of Consulate Gen. of Nigeria, 830 F.2d 1018 (9th Cir. 1987);
Grandbouche v. Clancy, 825 F.2d 1463 (10th Cir. 1987); Gibbs v. Air Canada, 810 F.2d 1529
(11th Cir. 1987); Combs v. Nick Garin Trucking, 825 F.2d 437 (D.C. Cir. 1987). The reported
decisions presumably represent just the tip of the iceberg. As this article later develops,
district courts frequently have no choice but to set aside a default judgment despite a de-
fendant's delay. See infra notes 68-91 and accompanying text. Because such decisions are
generally unremarkable, many district court judges presumably consider their publication
unnecessary. Cf. Grosberg, Illusion and Reality in Regulating Lawyer Performance: Re-
thinking Rule 11, 32 VmL. L. REV. 575, 586, n.37 (1987) (reported decisions on Rule 11
sanctions represent only a small fraction of the total number of such decisions). Indeed,
even at the circuit court level, there is evidence that decisions on default issues sometimes
are not reported. In Knight v. Knight, 833 F.2d 1515 (11th Cir. 1987), reconsideration de-
nied, 833 F.2d 1514, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals initially decided not to publish
an opinion on a default judgment issue; it published the opinion only after denying a motion
for reconsideration. Also, while the "reported" decisions researched in this article include
decisions reported on WESTLAW, it should be borne in mind that WESTLAW reports only
written opinions from a very limited number of districts. Telephone interview with Greg
Perlberg, WESTLAW representative (July 25, 1988).
10. See infra text accompanying notes 61-67.
11. See infra text accompanying notes 68-92.
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compensated for harm they suffer as a result of the delay. More-
over, the current Rule 55 procedure encourages needless litigation
of default issues.
This article addresses the failure of the default judgment rule to
provide a sanction for the many cases-generally cases of non-will-
ful delay-in which a default judgment is deemed inappropriate."
It first briefly reviews the mechanics and the genesis of the current
Rule 55 procedure. It then reviews the courts' frequent reluctance
to sanction non-willful delay with a default judgment and explains
the adverse effects of the lack of an alternative sanction. The arti-
cle concludes with a proposal to amend Rule 55 to include a fee
shifting sanction for those cases where a default judgment is
deemed inappropriate.
II. THE RULE 55 PROCEDURE
A. The Mechanics of the Rule 55 Procedure
Rule 55 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the default
judgment rule, provides for entry of a default judgment against a
party who fails "to plead or otherwise defend as provided by these
rules.""i A default judgment is a final judgment. As between the
parties it has the same effect as a judgment rendered after a full
trial on the merits. 4
Rule 55 sets forth a two-step procedure whereby a plaintiff (or
other party) can obtain an "entry of default" and default judgment
against an unresponsive defendant. 15 Rule 55 also sets forth the
12. While this article specifically addresses the default judgment procedure under the
Federal Rules, the analysis of the article would apply to many states' default judgment pro-
cedure as well. The default judgment procedure in many states is either based on or similar
to the federal courts' approach under Rule 55. See, e.g., Laughrey, Balancing Finality, Effi-
ciency, and Truth: A Proposed Reform of the Missouri Default Judgment Provisions, 51
Mo. L. REV. 63, 76-78 (1986) (proposing to mitigate the harshness of the Missouri courts
strict approach to default judgments with, inter alia, a fee shifting provision similar to that
proposed in this article); Pohl & Hittner, Judgments by Default in Texas, 37 Sw. L. J. 421,
441-47 (1983); Occhialino, Civil Procedure, 14 N.M. L. REV. 17, 31-33 (1984); Comment, Ser-
vice of Process-Default Judgment: A Practical Guide for the Arkansas Attorney, 40 ARK.
L. REV. 381, 392-400 (1986); Commentary, Alabama Rule 60(b): A Problem of Characteri-
zation, Limitation and Interpretation, 36 ALA. L. REV. 1019, 1023 (1985).
13. FED. R. Civ. P. 55(a).
14. 6 J. MOORE, W. TAGGART & J. WICKER, MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE part 1, 1 55.09 (2d
ed. 1988) [hereinafter, MooRE's FEDERAL PRACrICE]. A default judgment does not have col-
lateral estoppel effect as to other parties. Id.
15. Default judgments are available not only to plaintiffs but to other parties as well.
"The provisions of [Rule 55] apply whether the party entitled to the judgment by default is
[Vol. 23:203
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procedure whereby the defendant can seek to have the entry of
default or default judgment set aside.16 The following is a brief
outline of the mechanics of the Rule 55 procedure.17
1. Entry of Default
Rule 55(a) provides for the entry of a party's default. The rule
requires that the clerk of the court enter a party's default when
that party "has failed to plead or otherwise defend as provided by
these rules and that fact is made to appear by affidavit or other-
wise." ' An entry of default has no independent significance; it "is
just the first procedural step on the road to obtaining a default
judgment.""9 Once a plaintiff has obtained an entry of default
against the defendant, the plaintiff can then move for a default
judgment.
2. Default Judgment
Rule 55(b) provides for the entry of a default judgment.20 The
judgment may be entered by either the clerk of the court or by the
court.21 Where the precise amount of damages is not readily ascer-
a plaintiff, a third-party plaintiff, or a party who has pleaded a cross-claim or counter-
claim." FED. R. Civ. P. 55(d). As noted earlier, this article speaks in terms of plaintiffs'
complaints against defendants for the sake of simplicity. See supra note 1.
16. FED. R. Civ. P. 55(c). While it might seem odd that a default judgment should be
entered in the first instance if it is possible that it will subsequently be set aside, there is no
reasonable alternative. Unless and until the defendant responds, the court does not know
whether the defendant is simply late-such that the judgment would later be set aside-or
is deliberately ignoring the plaintiff's claim. The court could postpone entry of a default
judgment, and either wait for the defendant to respond or attempt some form of notice to
the defendant in addition to that provided by service of the summons and complaint. Doing
so, however, would denigrate the court's authority and the Rule 12 time limit for the de-
fendant's response.
17. Sections (a), (b), and (c) of Rule 55 are relevant to this article and are described in
the text. Subsection (d) merely explains that the Rule applies to plaintiffs, third-party
plaintiffs, counterclaimants, and cross-claimants. Rule 55(e) sets forth the special require-
ment for obtaining a default judgment against the United States and will not be discussed
in this article.
18. FED. R. Civ. P. 55(a).
19. Shepard Claims Serv. v. William Darrah & Assocs., 796 F.2d 190, 193 (6th Cir. 1986);
see also Orange Theatre Corp. v. Rayherstz Amusement Corp., 130 F.2d 185, 187 (3d Cir.
1942).
20. FED. R Civ. P. 55(b).
21. Id. The clerk may enter a default judgment where the complaint is "for a sum cer-
tain or for a sum which can by computation be made certain." Id. Thus, the clerk may enter
a default judgment against a defendant when the precise amount of damages sought by the
plaintiff is readily ascertainable from the face of the complaint.
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tainable from the face of the complaint, only the court has the
power to enter a default judgment.22 If a hearing is necessary "to
enable the court to enter judgment or to carry it into effect," the
court may conduct such a hearing. 3 Thus, for example, the court
may hold a hearing to establish the amount of plaintiff's damages.
Following such a hearing, the court will enter the default judgment
for the appropriate relief.
3. Setting Aside Defaults
Rule 55(c) sets forth the procedure whereby a party can seek to
have an entry of default or default judgment set aside.24 In the
case of an entry of default, Rule 55(c) authorizes the court to set
aside the entry "for good cause shown. '25 In the case of a default
judgment, Rule 55(c) provides that the court may set aside the
judgment "in accordance with Rule 60(b). 26
Rule 60(b), which governs relief from final judgments generally,
specifies six grounds for relief "[o]n motion and upon such terms
as are just. ' 17 Rule 60(b)(1), on which the majority of defendants
rely when seeking to set aside default judgments,28 provides for re-
lief for "mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect." '29
The majority of defendants who seek relief from a default judg-
ment seek relief under Rule 60(b)(1) on the ground of "excusable
neglect. '30 Relief might also be sought under Rule 60(b)(4) on the
22. Id.
23. Id. R. 55(b)(2). If the defendant has appeared in the action, the defendant must
receive written notice three days prior to the hearing on the plaintiff's application for de-
fault judgment. Id.
24. FED. R. Civ. P. 55(c).
25. Id.
26. Id. "Theoretically, [Rule] 60(b) sets stricter standards for reopening a judgment than
[Rule] 55(c) provides for setting aside a default. Actually, the few 55(c) cases we have found
seem to use the same considerations as the 60(b) cases do .... ." R. RoDEs, K RIPPLE & C.
MOONEY, Sanctions Imposable for Violations of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 49
(1981) [hereinafter RODEs, RIPPLE & MOONEY] (footnote omitted); see also 10 C. WRIGHT, A.
MILLER & M. KANE, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 2694 (2d ed. 1983) [hereinafter
WRIGHT, MILLER & KANE] (standards that govern whether relief should be granted from
entry of default likewise govern whether relief should be granted from default judgment).
27. FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b).
28. See Project, Relief from Default Judgments Under Rule 60(b)-A Study of Federal
Case Law, 49 FORDHAM L. REv. 956, 970 (1981); see also MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE part 1,
55.10[2].
29. FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b).
30. See Project, supra note 28, at 970-83.
[Vol. 23:203
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ground that "the judgment is void"" l where, for example, the de-
fendant was not properly served, or under Rule 60(b)(6) for "any
other reason justifying relief."32
As the foregoing description suggests, a court may face the issue
of whether the defendant's delay warrants a default judgment at
any one of the three steps. The issue may arise when the defendant
moves to set aside an entry of default,33 when the defendant con-
tests a plaintiff's motion for a default judgment,3 4 or when a de-
fault judgment has already been entered and the defendant moves
to have the default judgment set aside.3 5
B. Origin of Rule 55
Rule 55 was adopted with the rest of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure in 1938. During its fifty year history, with the exception
of a 1987 amendment eliminating gender-specific language,3 Rule
55 has remained unchanged.
In large measure, Rule 55 adopted the procedure that had been
employed in the common law and equity courts since the late sev-
enteenth century.3 7 In equity, a decree "pro confesso" and, at com-
31. FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(4).
32. Id. 60(b)(6). Rule 60(b)(6) applies only to reasons for relief other than those reasons
specified in subdivisions (1) through (5). See MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE part. 1, 55.10[2].
33. In this situation, the court would have entered the defendant's default pursuant to
Rule 55(a), but the plaintiff would not yet have moved for a default judgment. See e.g.,
Wayland v. District Court, 104 F.R.D. 91 (D. Me. 1985). If the court refuses to set aside the
entry of default, itis virtually certain that the court ultimately will impose a default judg-
ment against the defendant. A defendant's argument in favor of setting aside a default entry
will not differ in substance from a defendant's argument in favor of setting aside a default
judgment.
34. The plaintiff would have already: 1) obtained an entry of default against the defend-
ant; and 2) moved for a default judgment. If the defendant appears at this point, the de-
fendant is likely to oppose the motion for default judgment and simultaneously move to
have the entry of default set aside. See, e.g., Kuhlik v. Atlantic Corp., 112 F.R.D. 146
(S.D.N.Y. 1986).
35. See, e.g., Standard Enters. v. Bag-It, Inc., 115 F.R.D. 38 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
36. See MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE, part 1, 55.01[7],[8].
37. Before the late 1600s, a judgment or decree would not be entered against a defend-
ant who failed to appear. Instead, the court employed various means to compel the defend-
ant to appear, including outlawry and sequestration of the defendant's property. In a 1729
case it was stated that "[t]he practice of taking a bill pro confesso is not of long standing,
the ancient way being to put the plaintiff to make proof of the substance of the bill, though
the defendant has stood out to the last process, a sequestration." Hawkins v. Crook, 2 P.
Wins. 556, 558 (1729). For a history of the English courts' early efforts to deal with unre-
sponsive defendants, see Williams v. Corwin, 1 Hopkins Ch. 534 (1824). See also Thomson
v. Wooster, 114 U.S. 104, 110-11 (1885); 3 W. BLACKSTONE, COMME TARnIES ON THE LAWS OF
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mon law, a judgment by default, or "nil dicit," could be entered
against an unresponsive defendant. 8 In either case, the defend-
ant's failure to defend would be noted and the defendant would be
deemed to admit the allegations of the plaintiff's bill of complaint.
Any necessary further proceedings-to ascertain the plaintiff's
damages, for example-would be ex parte, after which the court
would enter the appropriate judgment or decree. Were the defend-
ant to appear and seek to defend, leave of court to do so could be
granted in appropriate circumstances. There was little if any dif-
ference between the common law and the equity procedure.3
The equity rules which governed equity practice in the federal
courts from 1822 through 1938 codified this procedure. 40 In the Eq-
uity Rules of 1912, the procedure was set forth in Rules 16 and
17.41 These rules formed the basis for Rule 55 of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure.42
ENGLAND 279-92 (1847); 2 F. POLLACK & F. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 578-97
(1895) (13th century practice); T. PLUCKNETT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW, 385-
86, 681-84 (5th ed. 1956).
38. Hawkins, 2 P. Wins. at 556, cited in Thomson, 114 U.S. at 110.
39. Thomson, 114 U.S. at 111; Hawkins, 2 P. Wms. at 556.
40. See J. WEINSTEIN, REFORM OF COURT RULE-MAKING PROCEDURES, 62-63 (1977); P. BA-
TOR, D. MELTZER, P. MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO, HART & WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND
THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 750-51 (3rd ed. 1988); see also EQUITY R. OF 1822, at R. 6, 10, 20 U.S.
(7 Wheat.) vi-vii; Rules 18 and 19 of the EQUITY R. OF 1842, at R. 18, 19, 42 U.S. (1 How.)
xlvi-xlvii; EQUITY R. OF 1912, at R. 16, 17, 226 U.S. 653.
41. EQUITY R. OF 1912, 226 U.S. 653. Equity Rule 16 provided for the entry of an order
that the bill (complaint) be taken "pro confesso:"
It shall be the duty of the defendant, unless the time shall be -enlarged, for cause
shown, by a judge of the court, to file his answer or other defense to the bill in the
clerk's office within the time named in the subpoena as required by Rule 12. In de-
fault thereof the plaintiff may, at his election, take an order as of course that the bill
be taken pro confesso; and thereupon the cause shall be proceeded in ex parte.
Id.
Equity Rule 17 provided:
When the bill is taken pro confesso the court may proceed to a final decree at any
time after the expiration of thirty days after the entry of the order pro confesso, and
such decree shall be deemed absolute, unless the court shall, at the same term, set
aside the same, or enlarge the time for filing the answer, upon cause shown upon
motion and affidavit. No such motion shall be granted, unless upon the payment of
the costs of the plaintiff up to that time, or such part thereof as the court shall deem
reasonable, and unless the defendant shall undertake to file his answer within such
time as the court shall direct, and submit to such other terms as the court shall di-
rect, for the purpose of speeding the cause.
Id.
42. See FED. R. Civ. P. 55, advisory committee's note; 6 J. MOORE, W. TAGGART, & J.
WICKER, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE part 1, 1 55.02[2] (2d ed. 1988) ("[Equity] Rules 16 and
17 are probably the most important sources [of Rule 55].").
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The drafters of the Federal Rules chose to retain the basic struc-
ture of the pre-Rules default judgment procedure. Nevertheless,
adoption of the Rules did effect two changes. First, adoption of the
Rules substantially increased the period during which a defendant
could have a default judgment set aside. Prior to the Rules, relief
from a default judgment-or any judgment-could be had only
during the term of court in which the judgment was rendered. 43 If
the judgment happened to be entered at the end of the term, relief
might be available for only a few days.44 Under the Rules, however,
relief from a default judgment may be granted for up to one year,
and sometimes longer, after it is entered.4 5 Second, whereas the eq-
uity rules had contained provisions requiring the court to take
measures to protect the plaintiffs interests if the court set aside a
default judgment, Rule 55 contains no similar provision. Rule 17 of
the Equity Rules of 1912 provided that no motion to set aside a
pro confesso decree could be granted:
unless upon payment of the costs of the plaintiff up to that time, or
such part thereof as the court shall deem reasonable, and unless the
defendant shall undertake to file his answer within such time as the
court shall direct, and submit to such other terms as the court shall
direct, for the purpose of speeding the cause.41
It is unclear why the drafters of Rule 55 chose not to retain this or
any similar provision.47 In any event, unlike the equity rule on
43. Bronson v. Schulten, 104 U.S. 410, 415-18 (1881).
44. In West Disinfecting Co. v. Rosenthal, 56 F.2d 320 (3d Cir. 1932), for example, after
the plaintiff failed to answer a counterclaim, a decree pro confesso was entered on February
3, 1931. The term of court ended on March 19, 1931 and, 12 days later, the plaintiff moved
to set aside the decree. The district court granted the motion. On the defendant's appeal,
the circuit court reversed, noting that while the court might be inclined to open the decree,
it could not be opened after the end of the court's term. Id. at 322.
45. See FED. R Civ. P. 60(b).
46. EQUITY R. OF 1912, 226 U.S. 653. Rule 19 of the Equity Rules of 1842 contained a
virtually identical provision. See EQUITY RULES OF 1842, 42 U.S. (1 How.) xlxi-xlvii. No
similar provision appears in the 1822 Equity Rules. See 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) vi-vii.
47. None of the various sources of information regarding the origin of the Federal Rules
explain this change. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 55, advisory committee's notes; Rules of Civil
Procedure for the District Courts of the United States: Hearings Before the Comm. on the
Judiciary, 75th Cong., 3d. Sess. (March 1-4, 1938); INSTrruTE ON THE FEDERAL RULES OF
CIVIL PROCEDURE, AMRicAN BAR ASSOCIATION, FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE: PRO-
CEEDINGS OF THE INSTITUTE (1939); Clark & Moore, A New Federal Civil Procedure-I. The
Background, 44 YALE L.J. 387 (1935); Holtzoff, Origin and Sources of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, 30 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1057 (1955); 6 J. MooRE, W. TAGGART, & J. WICKER,
MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE part 1, V1 55.01-5513 (2d ed. 1988); WRIGHT, MILLER & KM,
supra note 26, § 2681.
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which it is based, Rule 55 does not provide for protection of the
plaintiff's interests in the event that a default judgment is set
aside.
These changes in the mechanics of the default judgment proce-
dure reflected the Federal Rules' general shift toward a predomi-
nant concern with resolution of disputes on their merits. In testi-
mony before the House Judiciary Committee regarding the
proposed Rules in 1938, the chairman of the Rules Advisory Com-
mittee expressed the drafters' strong preference for resolving cases
on their merits, unburdened by "technicalities:"
The books are full of meritorious cases destroyed by technicalities.
The whole trouble with our present practice rules is that they are
too technical, too much emphasis laid on form and practice, not on
the ultimate end. What you are really after is the truth and the mer-
its of the case.48
Indeed, the adoption of the Rules in 1938 has been described as
the triumph of the view that procedure, and all its "technicalities,"
should "step aside and let the substance through."4 9
In the default judgment context, this attitude shifted the bal-
ance away from protection of the plaintiff's interest in a speedy
and efficient resolution of the dispute and expanded protection of
the defendant's interest in resolution of the dispute on its merits.
Adoption of the Rules gave defendants more time to move to set
aside a default judgment and eliminated the requirement that de-
fendants compensate the plaintiff for costs resulting from the
default.
III. DEFAULT JUDGMENTS AS A SANCTION FOR NON-WILLFUL
DELAY
While the changes in the mechanics of the default judgment pro-
cedure might not have been significant of themselves, they were
not the only changes that resulted from adoption of the Federal
Rules. Adoption of the Rules changed the courts' attitude toward
use of the default judgment as a sanction for delay. In contrast to
48. Rules of Civil Procedure for the District Courts of the United States: Hearings
Before the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 24 (1938) (statement of
Hon. William Mitchell).
49. Subrin, supra note 5, at 944; see also Holtzoff, Origin and Sources of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, 30 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1057, 1059 (1955).
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pre-Rules practice, the federal courts today frequently hold that a
default judgment is not an appropriate sanction for non-willful
delay.
In the late nineteenth century, federal courts showed little sym-
pathy for a defendant whose negligence, or whose attorney's negli-
gence, resulted in a default judgment. In School District No. 13,
Sherman County v. Lovejoy,50 for example, the defendant wrote to
his attorney to request that the attorney appear for the defendant
but, unbeknownst to the defendant, the attorney did not receive
the letter until after a default judgment was entered and the term
of court had ended. The court found its decision not to set aside a
default judgment "abundantly supported by the authorities," and
expressed the view that "[11itigants are, for reasons of great public
importance, required to exercise due diligence in . . . defending
suits in which they are parties" and that "[clourts cannot make
rules to aid or relieve those who are guilty of negligence."'51
In Allen v. Wilson,52 the court expressed its impatience with yet
another "unfortunate defendant" seeking relief from the "occa-
sional hardship" of the well-settled rule precluding relief from a
default judgment after the end of the court's term. The court
opined that a defendant's negligence, "under a correct and logical
system of practice, ought to estop him from complaining of the
harshness of the rule. '5 3
Modern decisions under the default judgment rule by and large
reflect a different view. Relying on the policy of the Rules that
cases should be decided on their merits, the federal courts today
frequently refuse to impose default judgments for non-willful
delay.5 4
The federal courts today generally consider three factors in de-
termining whether a default judgment is an appropriate sanction
for delay:55 1) whether the defendant's delay was willful;5 16 2)
50. 16 F. 323 (C.C.D. Neb. 1882).
51. Id. at 323-24.
52. 21 F. 881 (C.C.E.D. Mich. 1884).
53. Id. at 882.
54. See infra notes 68-92 and accompanying text.
55. See, e.g., Direct Mail Specialists v. Eclat Computerized Technologies, 840 F.2d 685,
690 (9th Cir. 1988); Sony Corp. v. Elm State Electronics, 800 F.2d 317, 320 (2d Cir. 1986);
Meehan v. Snow, 652 F.2d 274, 277 (2d Cir. 1981); Keegel v. Key West & Caribbean Trading
Co., 627 F.2d 372, 373 (D.C. Cir. 1980); J. MOORE, W. TAGGART & J. WICKER, 6 MooRE's
FEDERAL PRACTICE part 1, 55.10[2] (2d ed. 1988); WRIGHT, MILLER & KANE, supra note 26,
§§ 2696-97.
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whether the defendant has a meritorious defense; and 3) whether
the plaintiff was prejudiced by the delay.17 When the defendant
lacks a meritorious defense, the plaintiff has been substantially
prejudiced by the delay, or the defendant's delay was willful, the
courts will impose or uphold a default judgment; these cases do not
present any conflict between the Federal Rules' goals of reaching
the merits and speedy resolution. In cases of non-willful delay,
however, where the defendant has a meritorious defense and the
plaintiff is not prejudiced by the delay, imposition of a default
judgment presents a sharp conflict between the competing policies
of the Federal Rules.
Defendants in most cases can easily establish a meritorious de-
fense. Many courts hold that the defendant need only have
pleaded a prima facie defense to establish a "meritorious de-
fense." 58 More importantly, if the defendant lacks a meritorious
defense, imposition of a default judgment does not conflict with
the policy favoring trial on the merits. If the defendant lacks a
meritorious defense, the policy favoring resolution on the merits
While the district court's decision on a default issue is said to be "discretionary," the
court's discretion is quite narrow. Some courts of appeals state that they will reverse a dis-
trict court's decision imposing or upholding a default judgment for only a "slight" abuse of
discretion. See, e.g., Williams v. New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc., 728 F.2d 730, 733-34 (5th Cir.
1984); Keegel, 627 F.2d at 373-74; see also INVST Fin. Group v. Chem-Nuclear Sys., 815
F.2d 391, 397-98 (6th Cir. 1987) (abuse of discretion regarding default issue need not be
"glaring" to warrant reversal). Indeed, in 1981, the authors of the Project, supra note 28,
found that the circuit courts reversed 44% of the reported appeals from denials of set aside
motions. While the circuit courts upheld trial court decisions refusing to set aside default
judgments 56% of the time, it should be noted that these decisions included not only cases
of non-willful delay, but also cases where the defendant had no excuse for the default. Thus,
substantially more than half of the district courts' "discretionary" decisions imposing de-
fault judgments as a sanction for non-willful delay are reversed on appeal.
56. Courts are required to consider the defendant's excuse for the delay by the express
provisions of Rule 55. Rule 55(c) requires the defendant to show "good cause" to have an
entry of default set aside. To have a default judgment set aside, Rule 55(c) refers to Rule
60(b), which generally requires that the defendant show that the judgment was entered as a
result of the defendant's "excusable neglect." Both the "good cause" and the "excusable
neglect" standards look to whether the default was deliberate or merely negligent.
57. Not all courts use precisely this formulation of the test. Also, some courts will con-
sider additional factors such as the amount at stake in the litigation or the promptness with
which the defendant sought to rectify her default. See, e.g., Savin Corp. v. C.M.C. Corp., 98
F.R.D. 509, 512 (N.D. Ohio 1983). See generally 6 J. MOORE, W. TAGGART & J.W. WICKER,
MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE part 1, 55.10[2] (2d ed. 1988).
58. See, e.g., Hritz v. Woma Corp., 732 F.2d 1178, 1181 (3d Cir. 1984); see also WRIGHT,
MILLER & KANE, supra note 26, § 2697; Project, supra note 28, at 999-1002.
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requires entry of judgment against the defendant, whether by de-
fault or otherwise."
Likewise, courts will impose or uphold a default judgment where
a plaintiff is "prejudiced" by the delay. Such "prejudice," however,
must be substantial to support imposition of a default judgment;
delay itself is not deemed prejudicial. 0 If the plaintiff has been
substantially prejudiced by the delay, then the defendant's delay
itself has prevented a resolution on the merits. In such a situation,
the courts will impose or uphold a default judgment and the plain-
tiff's interests are adequately protected. When the defendant has a
meritorious defense and the plaintiff has not been substantially
prejudiced, however, there is a conflict between the Federal Rules'
goals of reaching the merits and resolving the dispute speedily.
How courts resolve that conflict often turns on whether or not the
defendant's delay was deliberate or "willful."
When a defendant has willfully delayed, courts will not hesitate
to impose a default judgment. As the Seventh Circuit Court of Ap-
peals has put it: "[W]hen willfulness is clearly apparent, the liberal
attitude of vacating default judgments is sharply modified."61 In
Hal Commodity Cycles Management Co. v. Kirsh,62 the Seventh
Circuit upheld a default judgment based on the defendant's willful
failure to appear at a pre-trial hearing following three years of
"egregious dilatory conduct" characterized by the court as "com-
plete disregard for the district court."63 In Meadows v. Dominican
Republic,6 the defendant failed to answer the complaint after re-
ceiving service and actual notice and after repeated warnings from
the State Department of the consequences of a failure to answer.
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the default judgment
entered by the district court on the ground that the default was
59. See, e.g., Broadcast Music, Inc. v. M.T.S. Enters., 811 F.2d 278 (5th Cir. 1978); Pro-
ject, supra note 28, at 997-99. Where a defendant has not been properly served, however,
the due process clause precludes entry of a default judgment, even against a defendant who
lacks a meritorious defense. Peralta v. Heights Medical Center, Inc., 108 S. Ct. 896 (1988).
60. See, e.g., Packard Press Corp. v. Corn Vu Corp., 584 F. Supp. 73 (E.D. Pa. 1984); see
also WRIGHT, MILLER & KANE, supra note 26, § 2699.
61. Bieganek v. Taylor, 801 F.2d 879, 882 (7th Cir. 1986) (citing Textile Banking Co. v.
Rentschler, 657 F.2d 844, 854 (7th Cir. 1981)); see also National Hockey League v. Metro-
politan Hockey Club, Inc., 427 U.S. 639, 640-43 (1976) (per curiam) (dismissal proper under
Rule 37 for plaintiffs' bad faith failure to comply with discovery order); Project, supra note
28, at 972-73; Societe Internationale Pour Participations Industrielles et Commerciales, S.A.
v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197, 208-13 (1958) (Rule 37 does not allow dismissal of a case for plain-
tiff's non-deliberate failure to comply with a pre-trial discovery order).
62. 825 F.2d 1136 (7th Cir. 1987).
63. Id. at 1139.
64. 817 F.2d 517 (9th Cir. 1987).
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"intentional, culpable, and inexcusable. ' 65 In Hirschkopf & Grad,
P.C. v. Robinson,66 the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld a
default judgment based on the district court's finding that the de-
fendants had failed to answer after willfully attempting to avoid
service.6
Where a defendant's delay is not willful, however, courts fre-
quently hold that a default judgment is not an appropriate sanc-
tion. 8 In Hritz v. Woma Corp., 9 for example, the Third Circuit
Court of Appeals held that an eight month delay in answering a
complaint would not in itself justify a default judgment if the de-
fendant's delay was not willful.
In Hritz, the plaintiff was seriously injured in a mining accident.
Hritz wrote to Woma Corporation, the United States distributor of
the equipment that had injured him and when Woma did not re-
spond, Hritz filed a products liability action and properly served
the complaint. After Woma failed to answer, Hritz moved for a
default judgment and the district court granted the motion. The
court held a hearing on damages, at which Hritz presented evi-
dence, and thereafter the court entered judgment for Hritz. Al-
though Woma had notice of all the proceedings, Woma failed to
appear. After learning that Hritz would execute on the judgment,
however, Woma appeared and moved to set aside the default judg-
ment. Woma thus responded to Hritz's claim over two years after
Hritz first attempted to contact Woma, eight months after Hritz
filed the complaint, and four months after the court entered a de-
65. Id. at 522.
66. 757 F.2d 1499 (4th Cir. 1985).
67. Id. at 1503. Other recent cases upholding imposition of a default judgment based in
whole or in part on a finding that the defendant had willfully delayed include Men's Sports-
wear, Inc. v. Sasson Jeans, Inc., 834 F.2d 1134 (2d Cir. 1987); Technical Chem. Co. v. IG-LO
Prods. Corp., 812 F.2d 222 (5th Cir. 1987); Benny v. Pipes, 799 F.2d 489 (9th Cir. 1986); and
Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hall, 115 F.R.D. 491 (E.D. Mich. 1986).
68. Courts are not entirely consistent in defining the line that separates conduct that is
"willful," "deliberate," or "culpable," i.e., conduct that would warrant imposition of a de-
fault judgment, from conduct that would not warrant imposition of a default judgment.
While most courts hold that a default judgment should not be imposed as a sanction if the
default is attributable to mere negligence rather than the result of "willful" or "deliberate"
delay, see infra notes 69-92 and accompanying text, a few courts have indicated that negli-
gent conduct can be deemed "culpable" so as to warrant a default judgment. See, e.g., Gibbs
v. Air Canada, 810 F.2d 1529, 1537-38 (11th Cir. 1987) (complaint lost after being forwarded
by mail and defendant failed to use adequate procedural safeguards to prevent loss); Park
Corp. v. Lexington Ins. Co., 812 F.2d 894, 896-97 (4th Cir. 1987) (unexplained loss of com-
plaint); United States v. V. & E. Eng'g & Constr. Co., 819 F.2d 331, 336-37 (1st Cir. 1987).
69. 732 F.2d 1178 (3d Cir. 1984).
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fault judgement. ° The reason for Woma's default was that Woma
had referred the suit to its insurer, the insurer had referred the
suit to claims investigators, and neither Woma nor the insurer had
inquired about the status of the claim until threatened with execu-
tion of the judgment.7
The district court denied Woma's motion to set aside the default
judgment. On appeal, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals held that
the district court erred in imposing the default judgment based on
its determination that Woma was negligent: "[N]eglect alone can-
not sustain a default judgment."72 The court held that the record
was unclear on the question of whether Woma's default was will-
ful73 and therefore remanded the case to the district court.74
In Shepard Claims Service v. William Darrah & Associates,5
the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the district court
abused its discretion in refusing to set aside an entry of default
when the defendant's delay was "inexcusable" but not willful.76
The plaintiff in Shepard filed a breach of contract action and
served the defendant in February 1985. On February 22, 1985, the
defendant requested that the plaintiff agree to give the defendant
an additional forty-five days to answer the complaint. Defendant's
attorney's secretary confirmed in a letter that plaintiff had agreed
to give the defendant "45 days from February 22" to answer the
complaint.7 7 When the agreed time period had elapsed and the de-
fendant had not yet filed his answer, the plaintiff had the clerk
enter defendant's default.
Two weeks later, the defendant filed his answer and moved to
set aside the default. The defendant explained that his attorney's
70. Id. at 1180.
71. Id. at 1183.
72. Id.
73. The court also noted that the record was unclear on whether the statute of limita-
tions had run as to Woma's parent corporation-a potential defendant-and that the plain-
tiff might be prejudiced as a result. Id. at 1181-85. Nevertheless, the court suggested that if
this had occurred, Woma could be required to waive the statute of limitations defense on
behalf of its parent corporation, thereby remedying the prejudice. Id. at 1182 n.3. By impli-
cation, then, the possible prejudice noted by the Third Circuit Court of Appeals would not
have been sufficient to justify a default judgment.
74. Id. at 1185; see Third Circuit Review, Civil Procedure, 30 ViuL. L. REv. 942, 952
(1985) (concluding that Hritz establishes a "virtually irrebuttable presumption" that a de-
fault judgment should be set aside).
75. 796 F.2d 190 (6th Cir. 1986).
76. Id. at 194-95.
77. Id. at 191.
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secretary had understood that plaintiff had agreed to an extension
of forty-five days from the time the answer otherwise would have
been due under the Federal Rules. The defendant stated that the
secretary understood this despite the contrary written confirma-
tion, and that his attorney had relied on the secretary's under-
standing. 8 The district court denied the motion, finding that the
defendant's attorney engaged in "culpable conduct" in allowing his
secretary to arrange for the extension of time and failing to review
the secretary's letter.7 9
On appeal, the Sixth Circuit held that the district court had
abused its discretion in refusing to set aside the default.8 0 The
court began its analysis by noting that because of the "strong pref-
erence for trials on the merits in federal courts," the court would
review the district court's exercise of discretion on the default is-
sue using a "somewhat modified standard of review." "Trials on
the merits are favored in federal courts and a 'glaring abuse' of
discretion is not required for reversal of a court's refusal to relieve
a party of the harsh sanction of default . . . . '[E]ven a slight
abuse [of discretion] may justify reversal.' ,,81 The Sixth Circuit
characterized the defendant's default as "careless" and "inexcus-
able,""2 but went on to find that the default was not willful.
In Bieganek v. Taylor,83 the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals
held that a default judgment should be set aside on the ground of
excusable neglect in a case in which the defendant first appeared
in the action seven months after the defendant's answer was due.
Bieganek sued Taylor and others for commodities fraud and served
Taylor in January 1985.4 Taylor moved to Spain in accordance
with plans he had made prior to being served with the complaint.
Taylor claimed that before he moved and after receiving the com-
plaint, he mailed an affidavit to the court in which he denied the
allegations of the complaint. Taylor also claimed that he under-
stood that his co-defendants would represent his interests in the
case. The court never received the affidavit allegedly mailed by
78. Id. at 192.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 193-95.
81. Id. at 193 (quoting United Coin Meter Co. v. Seaboard Coastline R.R., 705 F.2d 839,
846 (6th Cir. 1983) and Williams v. New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc., 728 F.2d 730, 733-34 (5th
Cir. 1984)).
82. Id. at 194.
83. 801 F.2d 879 (7th Cir. 1986).
84. Id. at 879-80.
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Taylor and Taylor's co-defendants did not represent Taylor's
interests."5
The district court granted the plaintiff's motion for a default
judgment after Taylor failed to appear or file an answer.8 6 The
plaintiff presented evidence at a hearing on damages and the court
entered a default judgment for roughly $250,000 against Taylor. In
August 1985, seven months after Taylor's answer was due and five
months after the court entered the default judgment, Taylor ap-
peared and moved to set aside the default judgment. The district
court denied the motion on the ground that Taylor's neglect was
not excusable. 7
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that the
district court had abused its discretion in refusing to set aside the
default judgment.8 The court noted the need to balance the policy
favoring trial on the merits with the goals of efficient administra-
tion of justice and avoidance of prejudice to innocent parties, but
went on to suggest that the former goal should always prevail: "We
are not unmindful of the need for judicial eagerness to expedite
cases, to fully utilize the court's time, to reduce overcrowded calen-
dars and to establish finality of judgments. However, these com-
mendable aspirations should never be used to thwart the objectives
of the blind goddess."8 The court concluded that Taylor's neglect
was excusable and the default judgment should therefore be set
aside.90
As the foregoing cases suggest, provided that the defendant has
a meritorious defense and the plaintiff is not substantially
prejudiced by the delay, a default judgment often is not available
as a sanction for non-willful delay. Many appellate court decisions,
including those discussed above and several others, expressly reject
use of the default judgment sanction for cases of non-willful de-
85. Id. at 880.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 881-83.
89. Id. at 881 (quoting Boughner v. Secretary of Health, Educ. & Welfare, 572 F.2d 976,
978-79 (3d Cir. 1978)). The quoted language is clearly an overstatement if interpreted to
mean that resolution on the merits should always be favored over the speedy resolution
goal. The seventh circuit has allowed default judgments to be entered in cases involving
willful delay. See, e.g., C.K.S. Eng'rs, Inc. v. White Mountain Gypsum Co., 726 F.2d 1202
(7th Cir. 1984).
90. Bieganek, 801 F.2d at 883.
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lay.9 Moreover, the district courts frequently refuse to impose a
default judgment for non-willful delay and such decisions, if ap-
pealed, are virtually always upheld.e2 Forced to choose between the
"reach the merits" and "speedy resolution" goals of the Federal
Rules, courts understandably opt for the former. Courts generally
prefer to resolve a case on its merits, albeit slowly, than to resolve
a dispute quickly without regard to the merit of the claim.
Yet because Rule 55 fails to provide any alternative to a default
judgment to sanction non-willful delay, it operates to protect a de-
fendant's interest in resolution on the merits at the expense of the
plaintiff's interest in speedy resolution of the dispute. Needless to
say, the plaintiff's interest should not be sacrificed; there should be
a sanction for non-willful delay.
IV. THE NEED FOR A SANCTION
Non-willful delay-or any delay deemed not to warrant a default
judgment 9 -should be sanctioned. Imposition of a sanction would
serve to compensate plaintiffs for harm they suffer as a result of
91. Lolatchy v. Arthur Murray, Inc., 816 F.2d 951, 953-54 (4th Cir. 1987); INVST Fin.
Group v. Chem-Nuclear Sys., Inc., 815 F.2d 391, 397-400 (6th Cir. 1987); Passarella v. Hilton
Int'l Co., 810 F.2d 674, 678 (7th Cir. 1987); see also Practical Concepts, Inc. v. Republic of
Bolivia, 811 F.2d 1543, 1551 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (default judgment may be improper where
failure to answer "was the excusable result of 'a broad divergence in [American and Boliv-
ian] cultural, governmental, and political approaches to the present case' "); Project, supra
note 28, at 975-81. See generally WRIGHT, MILLER & KANE, supra note 26, § 2693.
92. See, e.g., Swink v. City of Pagedale, 810 F.2d 791 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct.
3274 (1987); Grandbouche v. Clancy, 825 F.2d 1463 (10th Cir. 1987); Smith & Wesson v.
United States, 782 F.2d 1074 (1st Cir. 1986); Dale v. Vermont, 795 F.2d 1004 (2d Cir.), aff'g
630 F. Supp. 107 (D. Vt. 1986); Draper v. Coombs, 792 F.2d 915 (9th Cir. 1986); Mendoza v.
Wight Vineyard Management, 783 F.2d 941 (9th Cir. 1986); Eitel v. McCool, 782 F.2d 1470
(9th Cir. 1986); Wahl v. McIver, 773 F.2d 1169 (11th Cir. 1985); Azzopardi v. Ocean Drilling
& Exploration Co., 742 F.2d 890 (5th Cir. 1984); see also Project, supra note 28, at 969.
Knight v. Knight, 833 F.2d 1515 (11th Cir. 1987), reconsideration denied, 833 F.2d 1514,
appears to be one of the only, if not the only, reported decision involving a court reversing a
lower court decision not to impose a default judgment. In Knight, the district court had
reversed a bankruptcy court decision to set aside a default judgment. The court of appeals
affirmed the district court. Of course, decisions setting aside entries of default or default
judgments are not appealable final orders; such decisions pave the way for disposition of the
case on its merits. Dimmitt & Owens Fin., Inc. v. United States, 787 F.2d 1186, 1192 (7th
Cir. 1986). Nevertheless, a litigant who unsuccessfully sought a default judgment or opposed
a set aside request could challenge the district court's decision on the default issue in con-
nection with an appeal from a judgment on the merits. See Hoover v. Valley West DM, 823
F.2d 227, 230 (8th Cir. 1987).
93. See. e.g., Lolatchy v. Arthur Murray, Inc., 816 F.2d 951, 955-56 (4th Cir. 1987) (Wil-
kinson, J., dissenting) (majority decision held default judgment was improper despite dis-
trict court's finding that defendant's default was willful).
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defendants' delay. A sanction should also be imposed to serve the
goals of punishment and, more important, deterrence of delay. 4
The clearest reason for sanctioning non-willful delay is that it
imposes direct and indirect costs on innocent plaintiffs that they
should not be forced to bear. In some cases indirect costs are easily
calculated based on the time value of money. For example, in a
case that is ultimately resolved by a judgment or settlement for
$100,000, a one-month delay costs the plaintiff over $8,000, assum-
ing a ten percent return. In other cases, the cost of delay may be
difficult to quantify but is no less real. Consider, for example, a
plaintiff whose disability benefits have been wrongfully terminated
or who has been wrongfully discharged from his job. Delaying a
plaintiff's ability to vindicate his rights diminishes the value of
those rights. Delay may also work to deplete the plaintiff's re-
sources by extending the time that resources must be committed to
litigation. 5
In addition to indirect costs, delay imposes direct costs on the
plaintiff by forcing her to incur expenses incident to the delay. If
the defendant has not appeared or answered or has otherwise
failed to defend, it is up to the plaintiff to take the steps necessary
to force the defendant to respond."6 Carrying this burden requires
the plaintiff to incur additional expense. Depending on when the
defendant finally appears, the plaintiff must incur some or all of
the costs and expense-primarily in the form of attorney's
fees-associated with: 1) having the clerk enter the defendant's de-
fault; 2) moving for a default judgment; 3) preparing for and par-
ticipating in a hearing on damages; and 4) litigating the defend-
94. See RODEs, RIPPLE & MooNEY, supra note 26, at 85-86. Sanctions are imposed to
serve one or more of the goals of compensation, punishment or deterrence. See Nelken,
Sanctions Under Amended Federal Rule 11-Some "Chilling" Problems in the Struggle
Between Compensation and Punishment, 74 GEO. L.J. 1313, 1323-25 (1986); Note, The
Emerging Deterrence Orientation in the Imposition of Discovery Sanctions, 91 HARV. L.
REV. 1033 (1978).
95. This effect is also a function of the time value of money. If a plaintiff must pay an
attorney at the start of the case (which will generally be true, absent a contingency fee
arrangement), the longer the case takes to resolve the greater the cost of those funds to the
plaintiff. The cost may be direct, in the form of interest due on borrowed funds, or indirect,
in the form of inability to devote the funds to other uses.
96. A plaintiff interested in moving the case forward cannot simply wait for the defend-
ant to respond. Likewise, it would be unrealistic for a plaintiff to expect the court to act on
its own to force the defendant to respond; courts generally pay no attention to a case in its
initial stages. "At most, inactive cases are monitored by some courts through a sporadic
attempt to dismiss for lack of prosecution those cases in which no activity has been recorded
for a defined period of time, usually one or two years." CHURCH, supra note 7, at 67.
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ant's set aside motion. Absent a sanction, under the current Rule
55 procedure none of these expenses are reimbursed."
A sanction could also serve to punish defendants who delay.
Punishment may be an appropriate response to a defendant who
has failed to follow the requirements of the Rules. Nevertheless,
while punishment could be achieved to a limited extent by a com-
pensatory sanction, any greater degree of punishment is problem-
atic; punitive sanctions short of a default judgment could not ra-
tionally be applied in most cases of non-willful delay."
Finally, a sanction should be imposed in order to deter non-will-
ful delay. The effectiveness of any sanction as a deterrent, of
course, depends on its severity and the frequency with which it is
imposed. The degree of deterrence that a compensatory sanction
might achieve is unclear. Delay can result from many different
types of neglect and the cost of a sanction will vary depending on
the amount of expense incurred by the plaintiff incident to the de-
lay. Thus, it is difficult to say whether the cost of a sanction would
exceed the cost of exercising the greater degree of care required to
avoid delay.99 In any event, it is clear that the current Rule 55 pro-
vides no sanction and therefore no deterrent to non-willful delay.
To at least increase the possibility of deterrence, some form of
sanction is needed.
97. The point here is that there is nothing in Rule 55 to support a claim by the plaintiff
for reimbursement of these expenses. As will be discussed infra notes 100-107 and accompa-
nying text, the courts sometimes, though not often, impose a sanction by invoking their
"inherent power" or by setting aside a default judgment under Rule 60(b) "upon such terms
as are just." FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b).
98. RODES, RIPPLE & MooNEY, supra note 26, proposes amending Rule 55 to provide that
when a default judgment is set aside, or in lieu of entering a judgment by default, the court
may impose any sanction provided for in Rule 37(b). Id. at 89.
Rule 37(b) provides for a variety of sanctions, ranging from imposition of costs and fees to
a default judgment. FED. R. Civ. P. 37(b). The harsher sanctions, such as a default judgment,
obviously would not avoid the problems existing under the current Rule 55. The intermedi-
ate sanctions provided under Rule 37(b), such as "an order refusing to allow the disobedient
party to support or oppose designated claims or defenses," id., could rarely be selected or
imposed in a rational manner at the pre-answer stage or in any other context (other than
discovery) where Rule 55 would come into play. Consequently, most of the Rule 37(b) sanc-
tions would be inappropriate as alternatives to a default judgment. In any event, giving the
district court discretion to choose among the various Rule 37(b) sanctions would again invite
satellite litigation that could result in as much if not more delay than that which gave rise to
the sanctions issue. See infra note 124.
99. Stated otherwise:
Cost shifting itself. . . is likely to be effective as a deterrent only to the extent that
the costs incurred happen to outweigh the benefits derived, for example, from delay.
In all other cases, we must assume that sanctions will be accepted as a cost of litiga-
tion and that the conduct will continue. . .
Nelken, supra note 94, at 1325.
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Some decisions recognize the need for some alternative sanction.
District courts sometimes will impose a fee award against a de-
fendant incident to setting aside a default,'00 relying on the court's
"inherent power" to manage its docket' 01 or the provision of Rule
60(b) whereby the court may set aside a judgment "upon such
terms as are just."'1 2 Appellate court decisions sometimes refer to a
district court's power to impose a fee award in this situation.0 3 In
Bieganek v. Taylor,10 4 for example, the Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals stated that the neglect of the defendant that led to the
entry of a default judgment "should be excused, but not without a
price."'01 5 The court ordered the defendant to pay the costs of the
appeal, including the plaintiff's reasonable attorney's fees, and
noted that "the district court, on remand may, in its discretion,
impose additional other reasonable sanctions for the impact of
Taylor's excusable neglect in that court."'06
These decisions, however, are uncommon. Of the reported cases
in 1987 in which a default or default judgment was set aside, only
seven suggested or imposed any alternative sanction. 0 7 Most of the
decisions simply hold that a default judgment is an inappropriate
100. See, e.g., Joseph v. Office of Consulate Gen. of Nigeria, 830 F.2d 1018, 1020 (9th
Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1077 (1988) (noting that district court had imposed fees);
Walpex Trading Co. v. Yacimientos Petroliferos Fiscales Bolivianos, 109 F.R.D. 692, 698
(S.D.N.Y. 1986); Kleckner v. Glover Trucking Corp., 103 F.R.D. 553, 556-58 (M.D. Pa.
1984); Savin Corp. v. C.M.C. Corp., 98 F.R.D. 509, 512 (N.D. Ohio 1983); Gerlach v. Michi-
gan Bell Tel. Co., 448 F. Supp. 1168, 1174 (E.D. Mich. 1978); Hanley v. Volpe, 48 F.R.D.
387, 388 (E.D. Wis. 1970); see also WRIGHT, MILLER & KANE, supra note 26, § 2700; Project,
supra note 28, at 1007-08 nn. 283-84.
101. See Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 764 (1980).
102. FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b).
103. See, e.g., Bieganek v. Taylor, 801 F.2d 879, 883 (7th Cir. 1986); Lolatchy v. Arthur
Murray, Inc., 816 F.2d 951, 953 (4th Cir. 1987). Some courts of appeals will refer to a district
court's power to impose a "lesser sanction" in lieu of a default judgment without specifying
the nature of such a sanction. See, e.g., Shepard Claims Serv. v. William Darrah and As-
socs., 796 F.2d 190, 195 (6th Cir. 1986); Wahl v. McIver, 773 F.2d 1169, 1174 (11th Cir.
1985); Feliciano v. Reliant Tooling Co., 691 F.2d 653, 657 (3d Cir. 1982).
104. Bieganek, 801 F.2d at 879.
105. Id. at 883.
106. Id.
107. Joseph v. Office of Consulate Gen. of Nigeria, 830 F.2d 1018, 1020 (9th Cir. 1987),
cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1077 (1988) (noting that district court had imposed fees); Lolatchy v.
Arthur Murray, Inc., 816 F.2d 951, 953 (4th Cir. 1987); Kryzak v. Dresser Indus., 118 F.R.D.
12, 14 (D. Me. 1987); Morgan v. Hatch, 118 F.R.D. 6, 9-12 (D. Me. 1987); Levy v. Levy, 75
Bankr. 894 (S.D. Ohio 1987); Farmland Indus., Inc. v. Grain Bd. of Iraq, Civ. A. No. 86-3298
(D.D.C. 1987) (1987 WL 19222); Robert L. Haag, Inc. v. Shasta Beverages, Inc., No. 85 CIV
2985 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (1987 WL 12408).
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sanction for non-willful delay and fail to impose or even consider
any lesser sanction. 08
The current failure of Rule 55 to provide for any sanction for
delay other than a default judgment also may encourage needless
litigation of default issues. Even if a court might ultimately impose
a lesser sanction, a plaintiff might be unaware of, or at least unsure
of, the possibility of a lesser sanction given the present "all or
nothing" structure of Rule 55.109 The absence of any express alter-
native sanction arguably strengthens a plaintiff's incentive to pur-
108. Some courts completely ignore the fact that there is no sanction for delay when a
default judgment is held to be improper. See, e.g., Passarella v. Hilton Int'l, 810 F.2d 674
(7th Cir. 1987); Mendoza v. Wight Vineyard Management, 783 F.2d 941 (9th Cir. 1986);
Azzopardi v. Ocean Drilling & Exploration Co., 742 F.2d 890 (5th Cir. 1984); Jackson v.
Beech, 636 F.2d 831 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Meehan v. Snow, 652 F.2d 274 (2d Cir. 1981). Some
courts give lip service to the adverse effects of the absence of a sanction where a default
judgment is held to be improper, but fail to note any practical solution to the problem (such
as imposition of a fee award). See, e.g., Bermudez v. Reid, 733 F.2d 18, 21-22 (2d Cir. 1984),
cert. denied, 469 U.S. 874 (1984) (noting that a habeas petitioner should not be denied a
"prompt opportunity to meet his burden of proof" against a defaulting defendant, but fail-
ing to suggest how this might be accomplished).
Even if a court does impose or discuss a fee sanction in a particular case, there is no
guarantee that the court will do so consistently. In the Seventh Circuit, for example, al-
though the court of appeals expressly approved of imposing fees incident to setting aside a
default in two different 1986 decisions, the same court in a 1987 decision completely ignored
the possibility of a fee award. In Dimmitt & Owens Fin. Inc. v. United States, 787 F.2d 1186
(7th Cir. 1986), the court approved of the district court imposing a fee award incident to
setting aside a default and characterized the $4,000 fee award as "modest." Id. at 1193. In
Bieganek v. Taylor, 801 F.2d 879 (7th Cir. 1986), discussed supra in text accompanying
notes 83-90, the court of appeals imposed a fee award for the appeal and suggested the
possibility of a fee award in the district court as well.
Despite Bieganek and Dimmitt & Owens, in 1987 the Seventh Circuit was willing to ex-
cuse a defendant's default with no sanction at all. In Passarella v. Hilton Int'l Co., 810 F.2d
674 (7th Cir. 1987), the defendant defaulted after its insurer did not receive suit papers
forwarded by the defendant. The district court granted the plaintiff's motion for default
judgment and, nearly three months after plaintiff had filed his amended complaint, the
plaintiff presented evidence of damages whereupon the court entered a default judgment for
$18,000. After the defendant learned that the plaintiff was attempting to garnish the de-
fendant's bank account, the defendant appeared and moved to vacate the default judgment.
The district court denied the motion.
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that the default judgment should
be vacated because the default was not willful and the defendant had a meritorious defense.
Id. at 677-78. Notwithstanding the Seventh Circuit's earlier decisions in Bieganek and Dim-
mitt & Owens, the Passarella court did not suggest or even mention the possibility of as-
sessing costs and fees against the defendant incident to setting aside the default. The Pas-
sarella court made no mention of the harm suffered by the plaintiff as the result of the
delay or the absence of any sanction for the defendant's default.
If the court of appeals in a circuit does not follow its own suggestion that a fee award is
desirable, then surely one would not expect the district courts consistently to follow that
suggestion.
109. See RODES, RIPPLE & MooNEY, supra note 26, at 85.
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sue a default judgment as a sanction for delay. Even where it ap-
pears likely that a default judgment will not be imposed or upheld,
the plaintiff has an incentive to seek the only sanction which Rule
55 provides. 110 While this incentive exists regardless of whether or
not there is an alternative sanction, the availability of a lesser
sanction might lessen a plaintiff's incentive to pursue a default
judgment in a marginal case.
Finally, the "all or nothing" sanction provision of Rule 55 lacks
the flexibility of the other sanction provisions under the Rules.
Rule 11, which provides for sanctions for frivolous filings, allows
the district court to impose "an appropriate sanction.""' The
Rules Advisory Committee notes that the court "retains the neces-
sary flexibility to deal appropriately with violations of the rule"
and "has discretion to tailor sanctions.""' 2 Rule 26 likewise pro-
vides for imposition of "an appropriate sanction" 1 3 for inappropri-
ate discovery requests, responses or objections. Rules 16(f) and
37(b)(2) provide the district court with a choice among a variety of
sanctions, including a default judgment, for violations of discovery
orders and misconduct in the pre-trial process." 4
Unlike these sanction provisions, Rule 55 gives the district court
no choice as to what sanction to impose. According to the terms of
the Rule, the district court either imposes a default judgment or it
imposes no sanction at all.1 5 It is not surprising that given the
110. Plaintiffs have a strong incentive to pursue a default judgment against a defendant
who has delayed but then indicated a desire to defend on the merits. While the plaintiff
must incur additional expense and delay to pursue a default judgment, this cost is small in
comparison with the benefit the plaintiff could obtain. Not only could the plaintiff obtain a
judgment at least as to the defendant's liability, the plaintiff would obtain the judgment
without the expense associated with a full trial or even a substantive motion. Moreover,
there is no real risk to the plaintiff in pursuing a default judgment. If the plaintiff is unsuc-
cessful, the plaintiff will have lost some time and expended some resources but otherwise
will be in the same position as before.
A client or attorney taking a "hardball" approach to the litigation might also pursue a
default judgment for tactical reasons. After all, the defendant has violated the rules and this
violation has caused some harm to the plaintiff; simply acquiescing in the default might be
inconsistent with the posture the plaintiff seeks to maintain.
111. FED. H. Cirv. P. 11.
112. Id., advisory committee's note.
113. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(g).
114. Id. R. 16(f), 37(b)(2).
115. A court setting aside a default judgment does have the power under Rule 60(b) to
set it aside "upon such terms as are just." Id. R. 60(b). However, there is no reference in
Rule 55 to any alternative to a default judgment and in any event, courts setting aside
default judgments only rarely impose terms incident to the set aside, either under Rule
60(b) or otherwise. See supra notes 100-07 and accompanying text.
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apparent absence of any alternative to the harsh default judgment
sanction, courts take a liberal approach toward excusing defend-
ants' non-willful delay.
Rule 55 currently lacks, but should include, some sanction that
could be imposed in lieu of a default judgment in those cases in
which a default judgment is deemed inappropriate. Rule 55 should
provide for a sanction for non-willful delay to deter delay, to com-
pensate plaintiffs for expenses they must incur incident to delay,
and to reduce needless litigation of default issues.
V. A PROPOSAL FOR REFORM OF RULE 55
Rule 55 should be amended to provide for a generally mandatory
award of costs and expenses, including attorney's fees, when an en-
try of default or default judgment is set aside. This could be ac-
complished by adding the following language to Rule 55(c), the
provision of the Rule governing the setting aside of defaults:116
If the court sets aside an entry of default or default judgment, the
court shall require the party against whom the default or default
judgment was entered, or the party's attorney, or both, to pay to the
other party the costs and reasonable expenses incurred incident to
the default, including attorneys' fees, unless the court finds excep-
tional circumstances that would make an award of costs and ex-
penses unjust.
By providing for a sanction less severe than a default judgment,
the proposed amendment would promote the policy of resolving
disputes on their merits while at the same time promoting the goal
of speedy resolution of disputes and protecting the plaintiff's inter-
ests. By providing for a sanction in cases of non-willful delay, the
proposed amendment could go further toward deterring delay than
the courts' present sporadic imposition of sanctions. More impor-
tantly perhaps, the proposed amendment would compensate inno-
cent plaintiffs for the expenses they incur incident to defendants'
delay. 1 7
116. Rule 55(c) currently provides that "[flor good cause shown the court may set aside
an entry of default and, if a judgment by default has been entered, may likewise set it aside
in accordance with Rule 60(b)." FED. R. Civ. P. 55(c); see also supra text accompanying
notes 24-32.
117. This proposal does not provide any remedy for indirect costs of the delay which, as
noted above, may be substantial. See supra text accompanying note 95.
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The proposed amendment mandates an award of costs and ex-
penses unless the court finds "exceptional circumstances" that
would make an award of costs and expenses unjust. "Exceptional
circumstances" that would justify a refusal to impose the fee award
would exist where the court lacked jurisdiction to enter the default
or default judgment, such as where the defendant was not properly
served." 8
The "exceptional circumstances" provision is not intended to
support a refusal to impose a fee award in situations where the
defendant might be characterized as "innocent." A fee award
should be required in such situations for two reasons. First, the
plaintiff is no less "innocent" than the defendant; the plaintiff is
entitled by the rules to enforce the defendant's obligation to de-
fend. The plaintiff will incur expenses for which he will not be
compensated absent the fee award. Moreover, the delay itself will
work to the benefit of the defendant and to the disadvantage of
the plaintiff."9 Second, even if both parties are equally innocent,
the proposed amendment will simply place some of the cost of the
delay on one of the two innocent parties. Thus, the proposed
amendment is intended to establish what amounts to a strict liabil-
ity standard for delay. These principles could be set forth in an
advisory committee note to guide the district courts' interpretation
of the exceptional circumstances provision.
A mandatory fee award also would be consistent with the sanc-
tions policy underlying the recent 1983 amendments to the
Rules. 20 First, in order to deter delay, the 1983 amendments to
Rules 7, 11, 16, and 26 made sanctions mandatory for violations of
There is no provision in the Federal Rules that expressly attempts to remedy the indirect
costs of delay itself, even in those Rules that provide for an award of direct expenses inci-
dent to delay, such as Rules 11 and 37. While various commentators have suggested ways to
reform the litigation process to reduce delay, none have addressed the arguably more imme-
diate problem of how to remedy delay in individual cases. For example, what can be done to
remedy the cost of delay, per se, in the case of a defendant who delays in answering a
complaint or in responding to discovery requests? Perhaps this type of cost could be reme-
died through imposition of a sanction in the form of interest on the judgment ultimately
obtained by the plaintiff. Such a proposal, however, is beyond the scope of this article.
118. See, e.g., Stranahan Gear Co. v. NL Indus., Inc., 800 F.2d 53 (3d Cir. 1986). Another
example of exceptional circumstances where the court lacked jurisdiction to impose the de-
fault judgment is Jackson v. People's Republic of China, 794 F.2d 1490 (11th Cir. 1986),
cert. denied, 480 U.S. 917 (1987) (default judgment set aside because defendant was entitled
to absolute sovereign immunity).
119. See supra text accompanying note 95.
120. See FED. R. Civ. P. 7, advisory committee's note; id. R. 11, advisory committee's
note; id. R. 16, advisory committee's note; id. R. 26, advisory committee's note.
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the Rules.'21 Because Rule 55 provides a sanction for delay in situ-
ations not covered by the other rules, such as delay in answering a
complaint, the avoidance of delay policy behind the 1983 amend-
ments supports a mandatory sanction under Rule 55.
Second, the 1983 amendments provide for sanctions for non-will-
ful violations of the Rules. 122 While courts had never hesitated to
impose sanctions for willful conduct, the 1983 amendments made
it clear that sanctions are also appropriate for non-willful conduct
in order to deter delay and compensate innocent parties. 23 This
policy likewise supports a sanction under Rule 55 for non-willful
delay. The willfulness of a defendant's delay is relevant to whether
or not a default judgment should be imposed given the harshness
of that sanction. A defendant's lack of willfulness, however, does
not eliminate the need for a sanction to promote the Federal
Rules' goal of speedy resolution of disputes.
In addition to providing a sanction for delay and compensation
to innocent plaintiffs, the proposed amendment has the potential
to eliminate some of the needless litigation of default-related is-
sues that takes place under the current Rule 55 procedure. 124
Under the present "all or nothing" procedure, the plaintiff must
either completely acquiesce in the delay or pursue a default judg-
ment. Under the proposed amendment, the plaintiff would have
the option not to pursue the default judgment without having to
acquiesce in the defendant's delay. For example, if a defendant de-
faults and moves to set aside the default, the plaintiff could elect
121. See id. R. 7, advisory committee's note; id. R. 11, advisory committee's note; id. R.
16, advisory committee's note; id. R. 26, advisory committee's note; Nelken, supra note 94;
Rosenberg, The Federal Civil Rules After Half a Century, 36 ME. L. REV. 243, 246 (1984);
Subrin, supra note 5, at 984.
122. The advisory committee note to Rule 11 specifically notes that "[tlhe references in
the former text to willfulness as a prerequisite to disciplinary action has been deleted" and
that the amended Rule 11 standard "is more stringent than the original good-faith
formula." FED. R. Civ. P. 11, advisory committee's note.
123. Id. In addition, sanctions under Rule 37 are proper for non-willful conduct accord-
ing to the 1970 amendment to the Rule. See FED. R. Civ. P. 37, advisory committee's note.
124. It is unlikely that providing a mandatory fee-shifting sanction would increase plain-
tiffs' incentive to pursue default judgments. Plaintiffs have a substantial incentive to pursue
a default judgment, even in a case where it appears unlikely that default will be granted,
regardless of whether a fee award is available. See supra note 109. The guarantee of repay-
ment of fees which would be provided by the rule if it were amended is therefore unlikely to
increase significantly, if at all, the frequency with which plaintiffs seek default judgments.
Moreover, a plaintiff still must have a reasonable basis for seeking a default judgment. See
FED. R. Civ. P. 11 (a mere desire to incur fees and costs which the defendant would then
have to pay would be improper).
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not to oppose the set aside motion but only to seek the expenses to
which the plaintiff would automatically be entitled under the rule
as amended. By so doing, the plaintiff would eliminate the need to
expend additional time and effort in litigating a set aside motion.
Moreover, the court could dispose of the motion with little effort
by simply granting the unopposed motion to set aside the default
judgment and granting the fee award required by the amended
rule. Also, because the proposed amendment makes imposition of a
sanction mandatory in clearly defined circumstances, it would not
create a problem of "satellite litigation."'25
VI. CONCLUSION
The default judgment sanction ostensibly serves the purpose of
insuring that a defendant will respond to a claim against her in a
reasonable time. Because a default judgment is so harsh, it fre-
quently is an inappropriate sanction for a defendant's non-willful
delay. Such delay, however, should be sanctioned. Absent a sanc-
tion and under the current Rule 55 structure, defendants who de-
lay often walk away scot-free. Innocent plaintiffs are not reim-
bursed for expenses that they must incur incident to the default
and courts are burdened with often needless litigation of default
issues. Rule 55 should be amended to require an award of expenses
incident to a default in cases where the default is set aside. Doing
so would promote the Federal Rules' goal of resolving disputes on
their merits without sacrificing the plaintiff's interest in speedy
resolution of the dispute.
125. Any sanction designed to speed the litigation process may fail to achieve its purpose
if it spawns "satellite litigation" over whether the sanction should be applied. Rule 11, for
example, has been criticized for creating a new realm of litigation over the propriety of Rule
11 sanctions. See, e.g., Grosberg, supra note 9, at 647-53.
The proposed amendment to Rule 55 poses no danger of satellite litigation for three rea-
sons. First, the rule will come into play automatically when a party defaults and the default
is set aside. The sanctions of Rule 11, in contrast, come into play only after the court makes
the often difficult determination of whether a paper was legally or factually frivolous. See id.
at 601-09. Second, the sanction under the proposed amendment is mandatory unless the
defendant can show the existence of exceptional circumstances; few defendants will attempt
to meet the high standard under the rule for exceptional circumstances. See supra text
accompanying notes 117-18. Third, in contrast to Rules 16 and 37, for example, under which
the court has a wide choice of sanctions to impose, see FED. R. Civ. P. 16, 37, the proposed
Rule 55 would provide for only two sanctions-either a default judgment or costs and fees
incurred by the plaintiff incident to the default. Cf. RODES, RIPPLE & MooNEY, supra note 26
(proposing that Rule 55 allow for the imposition of any of the sanctions mentioned in Rule
37(b)).
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